Anthology – Peoples’ Plan for Life, Now and Forever …
Mr. Kennan then describes how he tried to set the record of his thoughts and feelings with Mr. Lippmann right, composing a long, detailed letter to him which was never sent but which he reviews for the reader of his Memoirs. He then relates what he did do: “I took a more cruel but less serious revenge a year or two later when I ran into him on a parlor car of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and wore him relentlessly down with a monologue on these same subjects that lasted most of the way from Washington to New York.”
“But the terms of the unsent letter still hold, as I see them, a certain interest as expressions of the way the Lippmann columns then affected me.
“I began, of course, with a peal of anguish over the confusion about the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. To be held as the author of the former, and to have the latter held up to me as the mature correction of my youthful folly, hurt more than anything else.
“I also naturally went to great lengths to disclaim the view, imputed to me by implication in Mr. Lippmann’s columns, that containment was a matter of stationing military forces around the Soviet borders and preventing any outbreak of Soviet military aggressiveness. I protested, as I was to do on so many other occasions over the course of the ensuing eighteen years, against the implication that the Russians were aspiring to invade other areas and that the task of American policy was to prevent them from doing so. ‘The Russians don’t want,’ I insisted, ‘to invade anyone. It is not in their tradition. They tried it once in Finland and got their fingers burned. They don’t want war of any kind. Above all, they don’t want the open responsibility that official invasion brings with it. They far prefer to do the job politically with stooge forces. Note well: when I say politically, that does not mean without violence. But it means that the violence is nominally domestic, not international, violence. It is, if you will, a police violence…not a military violence.
“The policy of containment related to the effort to encourage other peoples to resist this type of violence and to defend the internal integrity of their countries.
“I tried, then, to explain (I could have done it better) that the article was in reality a plea — addressed as much to our despairing liberals as to our hotheaded right-wingers — for acceptance of the belief that, ugly as was the problem of Soviet power, it was not inevitable, nor was it a suitable answer; that there was a middle ground of political resistance on which we could stand with reasonable prospect of success. We were, in fact, already standing on that ground quite successfully. And I went ahead to point proudly (and rather unfairly, for after all, Lippmann had approved and praised the rationale of the Marshall Plan in his articles) to what had already been accomplished. I cite this passage here, not as a correction to Mr. Lippmann, to whose arguments it was not really an answer, but as a sort of epilogue to the discussion of both Marshall Plan and X-Article.
‘Something over a year has now gone by since General Marshall took over his present job. I would ask you to think back on the state of the world, as he faced it last spring. At that time, it was almost impossible to see how Europe could be saved. We were still caught in the fateful confusion between the “one-world” and the “two-world” concepts. The economic plight of the continent was rapidly revealing itself as far worse than anyone had dreamed, and was steadily deteriorating. Congress was in an ugly frame of mind, convinced that all foreign aid was “operation rathole.” The Communists were at the throat of France. A pall of fear, of bewilderment, of discouragement, hung over the continent and paralyzed all constructive activity. Molotov sat adamant at the Moscow council table, because he saw no reason to pay us a price for things which he thought were bound to drop into his lap, like ripe fruits, through the natural course of events.
‘Compare that with today? Europe is admittedly not over the hump. But no fruits have dropped [into Molotov’s lap]. We know what is West and what is East. Moscow was itself compelled to make that unpleasant delineation. Recovery is progressing rapidly in the West. New hope exists. People see the possibility of a better future. The Communist position in France has been deeply shaken. The Western nations have found common political language. They are learning to lean on each other, and to help each other. Those who fancied they were neutral are beginning to realize that they are on our side. A year ago only that which was Communist had firmness and structure. Today the non-Communist world is gaining daily in rigidity and in the power of resistance. Admittedly, the issue hangs on Italy; but it hangs, in reality, on Italy alone. A year ago it hung on all of Europe and on us.
‘You may say: this was not the doing of U.S. policy makers; it was others who worked this miracle.
‘Certainly, we did not do it alone; and I have no intention of attempting to apportion merit. But you must leave us some pride in our own legerdemain. In international affairs, the proof of the pudding is always in the eating. If the development of the past year had been in the opposite direction – if there had been a deterioration of our position as great as the actual improvement – there is not one of you who would not have placed the blame squarely on the failure of American statesmanship. Must it always, then, be ‘heads you win; tails I lose’ for the U.S. Government?’
“In the years that have passed since that time, the myth of the ‘doctrine of containment’ has never fully lost its spell. On innumerable occasions, I have been asked to explain it, to say whether I thought it had been a success, to explain how it applied to China, to state a view as to whether it was still relevant in later situations, etc. It has been interpreted by others in a variety of ways. Pro-Soviet writers have portrayed it as the cloak for aggressive designs on the Soviet Union. Right-wing critics have assailed it precisely for its lack of aggressiveness: for its passivity, for its failure to promise anything like ‘victory.’ Serious commentators have maintained that it was all very well in 1947 but that it lost its rationale with the Korean War, or with Stalin’s death, or with the decline of bipolarity.
“It is hard for me to respond to all these criticisms. What I said in the X-Article was not intended as a doctrine. I am afraid that when I think about foreign policy, I do not think in terms of doctrines. I think in terms of principles.
“In writing the X-Article, I had in mind a long series of what seemed to me to be concessions that we had made, during the course of the war and just after it, to Russian expansionist tendencies – concessions made in the hope and belief that they would promote collaboration between our government and the Soviet government in the postwar period. I had also in mind the fact that many people, seeing that these concessions had been unsuccessful and that we had been unable to agree with the Soviet leaders on the postwar order Europe and Asia, were falling into despair and jumping to the panicky conclusion that this spelled the inevitability of an eventual war between the Soviet Union and the United States.